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WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS-1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
WILLIAM J. BOWE*
Freedom of Testation:
Other than the statutory forced share of a spouse' testators have
almost unlimited freedom in -the disposition of their property. A
devise or bequest will be held invalid only when it runs counter to
some well established rule of public policy. Thus gifts in violation of
the rule against perpetuities, against accumulations or against re-
straints on alienations are void. Further, the courts will strike down
capricious or whimsical bequests, as well as those which are condi-
tioned upon the performance of illegal or tortious acts.2 But in ab-
sence of any violation of public policy a testator is free to do what
he will with his property.
In National Bank of Commerce v. Greenbergs a decedent estab-
lished a testementary trust for his granddaughter, the child of a
deceased son. He provided, however, that should the granddaughter
-be adopted by any person other than a member of his immediate
family and her name be changed before she attained 18 "then this
trust shall terminate and the trust fund shall be paid equally to my
three children." The beneficiary's mother remarried and her second
husband formally adopted the child and formally changed her name.
Thus there was no question that the condition of the gift had been
broken. It was argued, however, that the restraint was void as violat-
ing public policy and further, because the infant could not consent,
she ought not to be penalized for an involuntary breach.
The court held that this limited restraint was not contrary to the
public policy of Tennessee. While it is hard to conceive of a non-
general restraint of broader scope (since it included all except the
testator's immediate family) the objective seems not unreasonable.
The testator wanted to deter the mother from permitting the adoption
and change of name should she remarry. The restraint created no real
risk that the child might become a public charge. It was not whimsical
nor wholly arbitrary, whatever one's views as to its fairness may be.
While it is arguable that there might be undesirable psychological
repercussions upon a child reared in a home where the child does not
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. TENNESSEE CODE ANN. § 8360 (Williams 1934).
2. 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 60, pp. 374-98 (1939).
3. 195 Tenn. 217, 258 S.W.2d 765 (1953).
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bear the parents' name, this objection would seem less weighty than
the policy in favor of freedom of testation.
The court had no difficulty in disposing of the argument that the
forfeiture occurred without the consent of the beneficiary. It was
clear that the decedent intended the gift to survive or fail depending
on the conduct of third parties-a perfectly permissible objective. For
example, I suppose all would agree that donated property may shift
from A to B when and if C marries.
Since the court decided that the condition did not violate public
policy it did not have to face the question of whether if the condition
were void, the child could keep the property.
It seems clear that a bequest to X provided he murders his mother-
in-law is void and the general rule is that X takes and keeps whether
the condition is precedent or subsequent.4 It is believed, however,
that draftsmen troubled about the validity of particular conditions
may avoid this rule of letting the beneficiary keep by providing for
a gift over in the event a court should hold the bequest invalid. This
technique may at times be useful in at least partially achieving the
testator's intention of keeping the property out of the hands of a donee
who, absent the condition, he desires shall not take. Thus in Girard
Trust Company v. Schmitz,5 a New Jersey case, a decedent left his
property in trust to pay the income to two of his three brothers and
two of his three sisters for twenty years and then to pay them the
principal if they complied with the provisions of the will. The will
then stated that the gifts were upon the express condition that the
interest of any beneficiary should cease if he or she should at any
time communicate with the excluded brother or sister. In that event
the property was to go to a charitable institution. It was further pro-
vided that if the court should declare the provision invalid, the prop-
erty should go directly to the charitable institution. Held, the prohibi-
tion of family communication was void as against public policy and
the gift over took effect. The court said, "The Testator has said in
plain language that he did not want the brother and sister legatees
4. In In re Sterne's Estate, 147 Misc. 59, 263 N.Y. Supp. 304 (Surr. Ct. 1933),
a testator left money in trust to pay the income to a hospital on condition that
it should make a rule that physicians should split their fees with the hospital,
and it was provided that if the hospital should refuse to make such a rule or
should abrogate it or neglect to enforce it, the trust should cease and the trust
fund should be paid to the Salvation Army. Held, the condition was illegal,
and whether it was a condition precedent or subsequent the hospital was en-
titled to the income.
5. 129 N.J. Eq. 444, 20 A.2d 21 (1941).
[ VOL. 7
WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
named in Clause "Third" of the will to take his property except upon
the condition therein expressly set forth. If this condition were held
invalid, then, and in that event, he preferred an entirely different and
less complicated scheme of disposition of his estate. This alternative
scheme he expressed in Paragraph "Seventh" of his will in plain and
understandable language, as it was his undoubted right to do."0
Execution of Will:
Formalities: Problems with respect to the formal requirements in
the execution of wills continue to furnish a fertile field of litigation.
In Lawrence v. Lawrence7 discussed in the 1952-53 Survey8 probate
was denied a will because one of the attesting witnesses testified, when
the will was offered for probate, that she did not know the nature
of the document she had witnessed. The testator had failed to tell her
it was his will.
During the last year legatees have faired better. In Leathers v.
Binkley"' the will, while it lacked the usual attestation clause, gave
every appearance of proper execution. It was objected to, however,
on the grounds that (1) the testator did not sign in the presence of
the witnesses, (2) she did not declare to them that it was her will,
and (3) the witnesses did not sign in the presence of each other. There
was no affirmative evidence either way on these issues. Nor were there
any witnesses called other than the two who attested the document.
They were an employer (in whose office the signing occurred) and
his secretary. The employer did not remember whether he requested
his secretary to witness before or after the testator signed. The sec-
retary had no recollection of the occasion. She had known the de-
cedent and of course recognized her own signature. She testified in
response to the question why had she written her name on the instru-
ment: "I am sure they asked me to." The court sustained the will
even though the details of attestation could not be remembered since
there was no affirmative evidence that the formalities had not been
complied with, thus recognizing a presumption of validity once the
paper is shown to have been signed by the testator and the requisite
number of witnesses.
There has never been any question about the capacity of persons
6. 129 N.J. Eq. at 472, 20 A.2d at 37.
7. 250 S.W. 2d 781 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1951).
8. Bowe, Wills, Estates and Trusts-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. REV.
1126 (1953).
9. 264 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1954).
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who are unable to read; write or see to make Wills. But special care
is required in the execution of such instruments to guard against
imposition upon such handicapped persons. The ecclesiastical courts
insisted on proof that the instrument had been read to a blind or
illiterate person. While reading is not required today, there must be
some proof that the testator had knowledge of the contents of the
instrument. Tennessee follows the rule that the otherwise strong
presumption that a testator knows the contents of his duly executed
will does not apply in the case of persons who cannot read.
In Morrow v. Person0 the will, in the handwriting of an attorney,
was signed with an "X" by an illiterate testator. The will left his
property, consisting in part of real estate, to his wife for life, "and at
her death to my daughter ... and after her death to her children."
The paper was probated in common form. Subsequently (after the
wife's death) the daughter mortgaged the fee of certain of the land.
The daughter would have taken the fee by intestacy but under the
will acquired only a life estate. Thus the mortgagee's full security
depended on the invalidity of the will.
The will was fair on its face, properly witnessed but there was no
evidence that it had been read to testator. An earlier Tennessee
decision had held in the case of an illiterate testator that "there must
be other evidence of knowledge of the contents of the will than the
mere fact of its formal execution,"'1 before it will be admitted to
probate. The court held the circumstantial evidence in Morrow v.
Person sufficient to satisfy this requirement. Testator had told his
wife of its drafting by the attorney and of its execution. "Reason and
general knowledge of the common practice requires the conclusion,
in the absence of contrary proof, that this attorney placed in the will
what his client directed and read the will as written to his client, since
he knew that his client could not read. The attesting witnesges had
no interest in the matter. The widow, children and grandchildren are
the only persons mentioned in this will as the object of the testator's
bounty. They are the ones upon whom he would naturally bestow
his bounty. There being nothing to arouse suspicion, the circumstantial
evidence mentioned was of sufficient strength and character to support
the conclusion that McCulley [the testator] was aware of the con-
tents of his will."
12
10. 195 Tenn. 370, 259 S.W.2d 665 (Tenn. 1953).
11. Bartee v. Thompson, 67 Tenn. 508 (1875).
12. 259 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tenn. 1953).
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Revival of Earlier Will by Revocation of Later Will:
Wrinkle v. Williams"s reaffirmed the Tennessee rule that a prior
will revoked by a later will may be revived by the revocation of the
second will if it is affirmatively shown that the revocation was with
the intention of reviving the earlier will.
Joint Wills: The needless use of joint wills continues to cause liti-
gation. 4 There is no reason why two persons may not execute the
same writing as the last Will and Testament of each. The instrument
is treated as the separate disposition of the property of each and may
be admitted to probate on two separate occasions. But where two
testators attempt by a single writing to treat their separate estates as
a joint possession to be vested in beneficiaries only on the death of
the survivor the disposition is invalid. The first estate may not be
held in abeyance until the death of the survivor for the purpose of
then probating the instrument as the will of both.15
Beach v. Cobble'6 again raised the problem of the validity of a joint
will. Fortunately there was sufficient language evidencing an intent
that the writing should operate immediately upon the death of the
first dying signer to enable the court to sustain it as his will. Pre-
sumably the joint will technique, rather than two separate wills, is
used to deter revocation by one party without the consent of the other.
As a practical matter it may decrease the risks of revocation by act
to the document. However, the objective of preventing revocation is
not necessarily accomplished since a joint will, by the better view,
does not conclusively establish a contract not to revoke.11 Separate
wills, identical in terms, to carry out the wishes of the testators, ac-
companied, if desired, by a contract not to revoke, seem preferable.
The real objection to the use of joint wills is the extremely difficult
draftsmanship problem they present. The terms must be equally
applicable to both deaths and provide for a disposition of the property
or the first to die during the interval between deaths. It can be done
but the pitfalls are many as those who have attempted it will attest.
Invariably some phrase will appear capable of being construed as
indicating an intention to hold the first estate in abeyance until the
death of survivor. Such phrases invite will contests. It is this difficulty
13. 260 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
14. Bowe Wills, Estates and Trusts-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. REV.
1126, 1127 (1953).
15. Epperson v. White, 156 Tenn. 155, 299 S.W. 812 (1927).
16. 260 S.W.2d 212 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
17. ATKwsoN, WI.Ls 226 (2d ed. 1953).
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of draftsmanship that has caused most if not all the litigation in this
field.
Holographic Wills:
Some nineteen states, including Tennessee, recognize the validity of
holographic wills, i.e., wills wholly in the handwriting of the testa-
tor. s The perennial problem in these cases is whether the writing was
really intended as a will, was merely an expression of the testator's
hopes and wishes, or was motivated by a desire to placate the persons
mentioned.
In In re Bramlitt's Estate-"' the paper offered was in the form of a
letter written by the decedent to her mother but it was written at
a time when the decedent was living in the mother's home. This
indicated that it was not in the way of ordinary correspondence. In
addition the terms of the document showed a clear testamentary
intent.
20
Correcting Mistakes in Wills:
Omissions and misdescriptions in wills are distressingly common
and account for a large body of case law on the extent to which words
may be added, deleted, or read as describing objects they clearly fail
to describe. In Greer v. Anderson2' the will, after providing for the
payment of debts, stated "Secondly, I give and bequeath to my sister
... so long as she may live, and then to Fred Anderson and Mary
Alma Greer." The third and last paragraph appointed an executor.
Here there was a complete absence of words indicating the property
the testator intended to give. However, his intention, found within
the four corners of the instrument, was obvious. He intended to give
the residue of his estate and the court so found. But in part at least
it placed its decision on a supposed rule that a court of equity has
18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8098.5 (Williams Supp. 1952). "No witness to a
holographic will is necessary, but the signature and all material provisions
must be-in the handwriting of the testator and his handwriting must be proved
by two witnesses."
19. 195 Tenn. 471, 260 S.W.2d 181 (1953).
20. The paper writing produced was in the words and figures as follows:
"Mrs. W. L. Coley May 11, 52
"I'm so tired & lonesome Mother I love you with all my heart and if anything
were to happen to me, I want you to have my son Walter Lee Bramlitt & my
home at 3156 Hull & everything I have-8 yrs. I've worked hard for a home
& now it is on the rocks-I've tried to get Eddie to lets try it again but he
wouldn't do it. Please mother dont let my son go to that farm. Daddy Coley
has been so good to Walter & Me. I love you.
"Yvonne Bramlitt"
21. 259 S.W.2d 550 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
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power to reform wills; that there is a power in equity to supply omis-
sions.
Query if this approach is sound. It clearly is not the traditional,
judicial approach to the problem. A will must be in writing but the
courts have always assumed the power to determine what words in
the paper offered are the words of the testator. As one famous English
judge has put it, "I can strike out words but I cannot insert anything. 22
The court may delete words which it finds are not words of the
testator but it cannot add words. Suppose that a will clause reads,
"I give Jones $. "23 Would not such a bequest fail no matter how
clearly it was established by oral evidence or by non-testamentary
writing that the testator intended the sum of $5,000.00? On the other
hand where a will gave A "my forty shares" of Y stock and the evi-
dence clearly established that the testator intended to give all his Y
stock an English court struck out the word forty as not a word of the
testator and left the will minus the stricken word to be construed.24
In a leading Kentucky case the court in holding that it did not have
the power to carry out the intent of the testator but only his expressed
intent as found in the words of the will, said "it is incompetent . . "
to show what the testator intended to say, but did not, but it may be
shown what was intended by what he did say."2 5 (Italics supplied).
The result of the Greer case is sound because from the very words
of the instrument the intent of the testator to give his residuary estate
to Elsie Greer appears. The words lend themselves to such a con-
struction. Indeed it is doubtful if they lend themselves to any other
construction. And in fairness to the court it should be stated that
much of the language of the opinion indicates that the result was
in fact reached through the technique of construction rather than
by supplying the words omitted by mistake. This discussion is merely
to suggest that that portion of the opinion stating that equity may
reform wills by adding words omitted through inadvertence perhaps
states the law too broadly. The earlier Tennessee case relied on for
this startling proposition states "The face of the will itself not only
demonstrates the mistake, but likewise furnishes the evidence by
22. See Goods of Shott, [1901] P. 190.
23. Cf. In re Wirsig's Estate, 128 Neb. 297, 258 N.W. 467 (1935); see generally
ATKiNSON, WLLS 281 (2d ed. 1953).
24. Morrell v. Morrell, [1882] 7 P.D.68; See also Waite v. Frisbie, 45 Minn.
361, 47 N.W. 1069 (1891).
25. Eichhorn v. Morat, 175 Ky. 80, 193 S.W. 1013, 1014 (1917).
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which the palpable omission may be supplied."2 Thus the rule in
Tennessee, despite the language of the court, may well be the tra-
ditional one of construing existing words, rather than supplying new
ones.
Oral Trusts of Real Property:
In Kelly v. Whitehurst 7 land had been conveyed to A under an
agreement that she would sell such portions as might be necessary to
satisfy the mortgages thereon and would thereupon reconvey any
unneeded parcels to the grantors. Some of the land was sold and
the liens satisfied in full. The grantors continued in possession of the
unsold parcels but no demand for a reconveyance was made prior to
A's death. Proof of the agreement was "clear, cogent and convincing."
The court held that the grantors, following A's death, were entitled to
a decree divesting A's heirs and vesting them with the title and that
their failure to demand a reconveyance during A's life did not con-
stitute laches in view of all the circumstances.
Contrary to the rule in most jurisdictions, it has long been settled
in Tennessee that trusts of land may be established by oral evidence.
No writing is required since Tennessee never adopted Section VII of
the original Statute of Frauds. However, the proof must be clear and
convincing. This seems to furnish an adequate safeguard.
The rule permits gift and death tax advantages in Tennessee not
available in most other jurisdictions. It does not appear whether this
was a factor in the present proceeding but there is a lurking sug-
gestion that it may have been, since the court, for no apparent reason,
notes that the decedent's net personal estate exceeded $60,000.00. This
is the federal estate tax exemption and as the decedent was unmarried
the marital deduction was not available.
Not infrequently on the death of one parent intestate and owning
real property the children will convey their interests to the surviving
parent under an oral agreement that he will devise the land to them
upon his death. In most jurisdictions the parent owns the fee and it
is subject to death taxes upon his death. However, in Tennessee and a
few other states the land should not be included as an asset in the
estate of the surviving parent since, because the oral agreement is
enforcible, he has only the naked legal title to the fee, the equitable
26. Eatherly v. Eatherly, 41 Tenn. 461, 469 (1860).
27. 264 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
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fee is in the children subject to the parent's equitable life estate.
This precise point was decided in a case arising in Texas where the
rule as to oral trusts is the same as in Tennessee.
2
28. In Reed v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1930), a father orally
agreed with his children to devise his estate to them, including property to be
received from them, in return for their conveyance of their interests in the
estates of their father's first and second wives. Pursuant to the agreement
the children executed warranty deeds to their father. The court held that a
trust was created in favor of the children, with the result that they remain
the equitable beneficial owners of the property conveyed, and such property
was therefore not subject to estate tax as property of the father's estate.
